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THEOLOGICAL FATALISM AND FRANKFURT 
COUNTEREXAMPLES TO THE PRINCIPLE OF 
ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES 
David Widerker 
In a recent article, David Hunt has proposed a theological counterexample to 
the principle of alternative possibilities involving divine foreknowledge (G-
scenario). Hunt claims that this example is immune to my criticism of regular 
Frankfurt-type counterexamples to that principle, as God's foreknowing an 
agent's act does not causally determine that act. Furthermore, he claims that 
the considerations which support the claim that the agent is morally responsi-
ble for his act in a Frankfurt-type scenario also hold in a G-scenario. In reply, I 
contest Hunt's symmetry claim and also raise a worry whether, given theolog-
ical fatalism, the agent's act in a G-scenario can be deemed a free act in the lib-
ertarian sense. Finally, I offer an independent argument why in a G-scenario 
the agent should not regarded morally blameworthy for his act. 
A widely accepted moral intuition has it that 
(PAD) An agent is morally responsible for his decision (choice, 
undertaking) to perform an act A only if he could have 
avoided making it.! 
One well-known type of counterexample to this principle (henceforth 
'Frankfurt-type counterexample' or 'F-example' for short) has the follow-
ing structure. A certain agent, Jones, decides at time T to perform an act A 
for reasons of his own. Unbeknownst to Jones, however, he would have 
been caused to decide to do A by some other agent Black, if he (Jones) were 
to show a sign X that he was not going to decide to do A. If, on the other 
hand, Jones does not show that sign, but a different sign Y that is contradic-
tory to X, then Black does nothing knowing that in this case Jones will 
decide to do A on his own. (It is assumed that Black knows Jones very well 
in that regard). Now, since in the actual situation Jones acts on his own 
without Black's intervention, it seems that he acts freely and is therefore 
morally responsible for what he does. But, given Black's presence, it would 
appear that Jones could not have avoided deciding to do A. This being the 
case, it is maintained that PAD is false.2 
In Widerker (1995a, 1995b), I argued that a libertarian should not find 
the foregoing counterexample convincing. The proponent of the example, I 
claimed, faces the following dilemma: Either the sign Y, which Black 
employs as a sign for not intervening, is associated with a deterministic 
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cause of Jones's decision (at T) to do A (henceforth 'D(A)') or it is not. If it 
is, then a libertarian should not accept the counterexample, since he holds 
that a free decision must not be causally determined. On the other hand, if 
Y is not so associated with D(A), then there is no reason to think that D(A) 
was unavoidable. 
Recently, David Hunt has proposed a theological counterexample to 
PAD, which he claims is superior to a F-type counterexample.3 Hunt asks 
us to imagine a situation in which Jones's decision to do A is foreknown or 
forebelieved by God. Let us call such a scenario a 'G-scenario'. The 
unavoidability of D(A) in such a scenario, Hunt claims, can then be estab-
lished on the basis of considerations employed in an influential argument 
for theological fatalism. According to this argument, if Jones were able to 
refrain from D(A), there would be a time T1 prior to the occurrence of D(A) 
and a possible future F relative to T1 in which D(A) does not occur. But if 
divine foreknowledge exists, then the past relative to Tl contains God's 
infallible belief that D(A) will occur. And this entails that every possible 
future relative to T1 contains D(A). Consequently, D(A) is unavoidable for 
Jones at T1.4 
In my earlier work on Frankfurt's argument against PAD, I did not con-
sider G-type scenarios, since the context within which Frankfurt placed his 
argument was a non-theological one. Hunt's paper gives me the opportu-
nity to defend the plausibility of PAD in a theological setting as well. 
Why does Hunt think that a G-type scenario provides a counterexample 
to PAD? Hunt offers two reasons. 
(a) In a G-scenario the unavoidability of O(A) is not guaranteed by 
a causal mechanism. It rests, rather, on the actual operation of a 
cognitive mechanism - God's prior belief that D(A) will occur-
that does not cause or compel what that mechanism cognizes. 
That being the case, the agent can be said to act on his own, and 
the example is not subject to my earlier criticism of an F-type 
counterexample. 
(b) The same considerations which support the claim that Jones is 
morally responsible for D(A) in a F-scenario also obtain in a G-
scenario. In a F-scenario, the factor that prevents Jones from 
acting otherwise does not play any role in leading Jones to act 
as he did. Indeed, everything happens there just as it would 
have happened without Black's presence in the situation, or 
without his readiness to intrude into it. For this reason, the 
presence of the counterfactual intervener is irrelevant to 
accounting for Jones's action. And, therefore, he should be 
deemed blameworthy for D(A). Hunt claims that all this 
remains true when we move from a F-scenario to a G-scenario.' 
Hunt's line of argument is tempting. If correct, it would weaken the plausi-
bility of PAD. In addition, it would also weaken the force of the influential 
argument for theological fatalism, on which it relies, showing that even if 
an agent's act is unavoidable, the agent may still be held morally responsi-
ble for it. I believe, however, that Hunt's attack on PAD does not succeed. 
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In what follows, I first explain why I think it is problematic. I then develop 
an independent argument showing that an agent in a G-scenario should 
not be deemed morally blameworthy for his decision. 
I 
To refute PAD, Hunt must provide a scenario in which Jones acts on his 
own and yet his decision to do A is unavoidable. It is far from clear that a G-
scenario meets this requirement. Note that, since God (as traditionally con-
ceived) is essentially infallible,6 the occurrence of D(A) at T is entailed (in the 
broadly logical sense) by God's prior belief that D(A) will occur at T. In this 
sense, D(A) can be said to be metaphysically necessitated or metaphysically 
determined by that belief of God. Now, if a libertarian rejects as an instance 
of an agent's acting on his own a scenario in which D(A) is nomically necessi-
tated by a temporally prior fact, why wouldn't he reject one in which D(A) is 
metaphysically necessitated by such a fact?' What, in my opinion, is crucial 
to the libertarian's conception of a free decision is that such a decision is not 
necessitated in any way by an antecedent fact.8 This condition is not satis-
fied in a G-scenario. Now, Hunt may object that metaphysical necessitation 
is not nomic necessitation. But note first that nomic necessitation is not the 
only kind of necessitation relation.9 Secondly, and more importantly, meta-
physical necessitation when defined as entailment between two facts, where 
the first fact is distinct from, and temporally prior to, the second one, seems 
to me a perfectly legitimate instance of a necessitating relation; one that, by 
my lights, is incompatible with libertarian freedom. If Hunt thinks other-
wise, it is incumbent upon him to explain why this is so. 
Hunt's attempt to refute PAD becomes more problematic when we tum 
to his second reason for thinking that a G-scenario provides a suitable 
counterexample to PAD, i.e., that the same considerations which support 
the intuition that Jones is morally responsible for D(A) in a F-scenario also 
apply to a G-scenario. As one may recall, central to Frankfurt's account of 
why in a F-scenario Jones is morally responsible for what he did, despite 
the fact that he could not have done otherwise, is the contention that 
(1) Jones would have decided in the same way and for the same 
reasons even if the factor that made it impossible for him to 
decide otherwise were absent. 
(1) is supposed to capture the idea that (a) the fact that Jones could not 
have done otherwise in a F-scenario is irrelevant to the explanation of why 
Jones acted as he did, and therefore should not be assigned any weight in 
the assessment of Jones's responsibility for that act.to In addition, according 
to Frankfurt, (1) is also supposed to show that (b) the lack of an alternative 
course of action in a F-scenario could not count as an excuse for what Jones 
did. l1 Notice, however, that (1) though true in a F-scenario, does not hold in 
a G-scenario. In that scenario the preventing factor is God's belief that 
Jones will decide to do A. Now, if that factor were absent, that is, if God 
were not to hold that belief, then, given God's essential omniscience, it fol-
lows that Jones would not decide to do A, which is contrary to what is 
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maintained in (1). 
Similar remarks apply to a related claim employed by Frankfurt for 
establishing (a) and (b), which is that Jones would have acted in the same 
way and for the same reasons even if he could have done otherwise.'2 Or 
putting this point in a slightly different way, 
(2) In a counterfactual situation in which Jones could have decided 
otherwise, he still would have acted in the same way and for 
the same reasons. 
Again, this claim turns out to be false in a G-scenario, since in view of the 
alleged incompatibility between divine foreknowledge and Jones's free-
dom to act otherwise, a situation of the sort described in (2) simply does 
not exist.13 
The upshot of all this is that there is an important asymmetry (of the rel-
evant kind) between a F-scenario and a G-scenario. The reasons for reject-
ing PAD which seem cogent in a F-scenario do not apply to a G-scenario.'4 
II 
Can a proponent of PAD go further? Can he, in addition to showing that 
Hunt's attack on PAD is fallacious, also offer an independent argument 
why in a G-scenario Jones should not be held morally responsible for D(A)? 
I believe the answer to this question is positive, at least in the case where 
D(A) is a morally wrong action and "morally responsible" is understood as 
"morally blameworthy." To see this, consider the following libertarian reply 
to the charge that Jones is morally blameworthy for D(A) in a G-scenario. 
Granted, for the sake of discussion, that in a G-scenario Jones acted on 
his own. Still, since you, Hunt, are holding him blameworthy for his deci-
sion to do A, tell me what should he have done in the situation in question, so as 
to be able to escape moral blame? Now, you cannot claim that he should not 
have decided to do A, since this is something that was not in Jones's power 
to do. Hence, I do not see how you can hold him blameworthy for his deci-
sion to break the promise. 
Call this defense the "What-should-he-have-done? defense" or for short 
the "W-defense." 
The W-defense points to an important reason why it is implausible to 
think that agents in a G-type scenario are morally blameworthy for what 
they did. When we claim that someone is morally blameworthy for a cer-
tain act, we believe that morally speaking, he should have behaved differ-
ently or should not have acted as he did. This belief is essential to our 
moral disapproval of the way he behaved.'s Sometimes, however, such a 
belief might be unreasonable. This might happen in a situation in which it 
is clear to us that the agent could not have avoided acting as he did. To 
expect in this situation that the agent should have acted differently is to 
expect him to have done the impossible. By implication, believing him to 
be blameworthy because he has not fulfilled this unreasonable expectation 
would be unreasonable.'6 
The above consideration leads to the following intuitive argument in 
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favor of PAD as applied to moral blame, i.e., 
(PADB) An agent is morally blameworthy for his decision (choice, 
undertaking) to do A only if he could have avoided making it. 
1. An agent S is morally blameworthy for doing A only if in the 
circumstances in which he acted it would be morally 
reasonable17 to expect that S should not have done A. 
2. If S could not have avoided doing A, then on pain of expecting 
him to have done the impossible, it would be morally unrea-
sonable to expect him not to have done A. 
3. Hence, if S could not have avoided doing A, then S is not 
morally blameworthy for doing A. (Q.E.D)18 
III 
Hunt has presented an articulate and ingenious argument in which he 
enlists a theological scenario to refute PAD. We have seen, however, that 
the assumptions it involves are problematic. Moreover, we have also seen 
that a strong case can be made for PAD where it applies to moral blame. 
All this lends further support to the claim that, pace Frankfurt et. alia, PAD 
expresses an adequate necessary condition for moral responsibility.19 
Bar-Ilan University 
NOTES 
1. The term 'morally responsible' as used in PAD is not intended to 
cover cases of derivative responsibility, i.e., cases where the agent is said to 
be responsible for an act by virtue of being responsible for the causal condi-
tions that led to it. Obviously, PAD would be false, if it were meant to apply 
to such cases as well. 
2. See Frankfurt 1969, 836. 
3. See Hunt 1996. For precursors of this example, see Fischer 1986, 55, 
and Zagzebski 1991, chap.6. 
4. Here I follow Hunt's presentation of the argument for theological 
fatalism. Another way of stating the argument is the following: 
D(A) is unavoidable for Jones at any given time T earlier than O(A), 
because the fact that O(A) will occur is logically entailed by some other 
fact that relative to T is unavoidable for him, namely, the fact that God 
believed in the past that D(A) would occur. 
5. Hunt op. cit., 399-400. 
6. By saying that God is essentially infallible, I mean that it is impossi-
ble for God to believe a false proposition. Also, God is conceived to be 
essentially all-knowing or omniscient in the sense that God cannot fail to 
believe any true proposition. 
7. A fact E is nomically necessitated by a temporally prior fact F just in 
case E is entailed by the conjunction of F and some laws of nature, and is not 
entailed by either conjunct alone. 
8. For a constraint on libertarian freedom along precisely these lines, 
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see Alston 1989,164-165. 
9. See Kim 1974. 
10. See Frankfurt 1969, 837. 
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11. Ibid, 837. Something counts as an excuse only if its absence would 
make a difference to the way the agent behaved, i.e., only if were it not to 
obtain, the agent would have acted differently. This, we know, is not true of 
Jones in a F-scenario. 
12. Ibid, 837. 
13. Here I am relying on the assumption that God is a necessary being, 
an assumption that is accepted by traditional theism. 
14. I say "seem cogent", since ultimately I hold that even in a F-scenario 
these considerations do not show that the agent is morally responsible for 
what he did. I defend this claim in Widerker 1998. 
15. See Wallace 1994, chapter 4. 
16. In Widerker 1998, I argue that the same defense can be applied 
against the attempt to hold an agent blameworthy in a regular Frankfurt-
type scenario. 
17. By "morally reasonable" I mean reasonable for someone who is 
aware of all the relevant moral facts pertaining to S's doing A. 
18. For a related, but still different argument for PAD, see Copp 1997 
and Widerker 1991. 
19. I would like to thank David Copp, Jerome Gellman, Dovid Gottlieb, 
Carl Ginet, Stuart Goetz, John Fischer, Bernard Katz, Charlotte Katzoff, 
George Mavrodes, Bill Rowe, and Bob Bunn for excellent comments on an 
earlier version of this paper. 
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